Abstract. The stream cipher SNOW 3G designed in 2006 by ETSI/SA-GE is a base algorithm for the second set of 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms. In this paper we study the resynchronization mechanism of SNOW 3G and of a similar cipher SNOW 3G ⊕ using multiset collision attacks. For SNOW 3G we show a simple 13-round multiset distinguisher with complexity of 2 8 steps. We show full key recovery chosen IV resynchronization attacks for up to 18 out of 33 initialization rounds of SNOW3G
Introduction
The SNOW 3G stream cipher is the core of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms UEA2 and UIA2, published in 2006 by the 3GPP Task Force [5] . Compared to its predecessor, SNOW 2.0 [4] , SNOW 3G adopts a finite state machine (FSM) of three 32-bit words and 2 S-Boxes to increase the resistance against algebraic attacks by Billet and Gilbert [2] . Full evaluation of the design by the consortium is not public, but a survey of this evaluation is given in [6] . SNOW 3G ⊕ (in which the two modular additions are replaced by xors) is also defined and evaluated in this document. The designers and external reviewers show that SNOW 3G has remarkable resistance against linear distinguishing attacks [7, 8] , while SNOW 3G ⊕ offers much better resistance against algebraic attacks.
In this paper we analyze the resynchronization mechanizm of SNOW 3G and SNOW 3G ⊕ using multiset collision attacks. This technique has proved itself useful against AES [3] but to the best of our knowledge has not been used yet for the analysis of the key-IV setup of stream ciphers. It seems natural to apply this technique to SNOW 3G since its finite state machine (FSM) is essentially a 96-bit AES like cipher in which the LFSR plays a role of a key-schedule. This picture is complicated by the fact that there is a feedback from the FSM to the LFSR during the setup phase (a feature never present in block ciphers) and that the attacker sees only 32-bits of output at a time, while the internal state keeps changing constantly.
We start by showing a very efficient multiset distinguisher for 13-round SNOW 3G with complexity of 2 8 steps. We then switch to the analysis of SNOW 3G ⊕ which is a very good model for the main features of SNOW 3G, since its analysis is not blurred by the presence of carries. We have found an attack on up to 18-rounds (out of 33) with a complexity of 2 57 to generate the data and 2 53 steps of analysis. In this attack for the first 10 rounds the multiset propagates for free since we put it in the most significant byte of the IV word IV 0 . It enters the FSM at the 11th round. Strong cancellations due to balanced properties of multisets stop to be useful after 15 rounds and we have to resort to multiset collision techniques which can allow us to go three more rounds deeper. Multisets still help us to cancel out the keystream words out of the keystream equation, which are an obstacle for a simple differential analysis at this depth. This attack is very technical and is more involved than attacks of similar type on block ciphers. We have experimentally verified the crucial parts of our attacks. This paper is organized as follows. We give a description of SNOW 3G and SNOW 3G
⊕ in Section 2. The multiset collision chosen IV attacks on roundreduced SNOW3G and SNOW 3G
⊕ are presented in Section 3. Finally, some conclusions are given in Section 4.
Description of SNOW 3G and SNOW 3G

⊕
The SNOW 3G stream cipher uses a 128-bit key and a 128-bit IV, considered as four 32-bit words vectors. It consists of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) of 16 32-bit words and a finite state machine (FSM) with three 32-bit words, shown in Figure 1 . Here '⊕' denotes the bit-wise xor and ' ' denotes the addition modulo 2
32 . The feedback word of the LFSR is recursively computed as
where α is the root of the GF ( 2 8 
, where S 1 and S 2 are 32-bit to 32-bit S-boxes defined as compositions of 4 parallel applications of two 8-bit to 8-bit small Sboxes, S R and S Q , with a linear diffusion layer respectively. Here S R is the well known AES S-box and S Q is defined as 
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Fig. 1. Keystream generation of SNOW 3G
where M C 1 is the AES mix-column for S 1 over GF (2 8 ) defined by x 8 + x 4 + x 3 + x + 1 and M C 2 is the similar operation for S 2 over GF (2 8 ) defined by 3 ) and the IV = (IV 0 , IV 1 , IV 2 , IV 3 ) as follows. Let 1 be the all-one word, first load the LFSR as follows.
The FSM is initialized with R 1 = R 2 = R 3 = 0. Then run the cipher 32 times with the FSM output F xored to the feedback of the LFSR and no keystream generated. After this, the cipher is switched into the keystream generation mode, but the first keystream word is discarded. Hence, there are 33 initialization rounds. The keystream word generated at clock t is SNOW 3G:
If we replace the two modulo additions in SNOW 3G by xors, we get SNOW 3G ⊕ .
3 Chosen IV Attacks on Reduced Round SNOW 3G and SNOW 3G
⊕
In this section, we evaluate the security margin of SNOW 3G and SNOW 3G ⊕ against chosen IV attacks. Our results are listed in Table 1 . We first look at SNOW 3G with 13-round initializations. For each secret key K, we randomly choose an IV and make a multiset at the most significant byte IV 0 0 of the most significant word IV 0 such that it takes all the byte values in [0, 255] exactly once. From the key/IV loading of SNOW 3G, we known that the multiset difference is introduced in the most significant byte of s 15 . Now we trace the multiset difference propagation in the 19 registers during the 13 rounds of initialization, which is shown in Table 2 . The differences at round i are the differences at the end of the corresponding round.
Here we actually have 256 IV s associated with the same key. Denote the first keystream word generated by (K, IV ) when IV 
From Table 2 , the least significant bit is always 0. To show that this property holds for the other 7 bits in the least significant byte, it suffices to note that the least significant bytes of R 1 forms an permutation set, while the least significant bytes of s i,15 are the same, so by lemma 2 in [1] , the least significant byte of 255 i=0 z i,0 is always 0. In experiments, we randomly choose 2 6 IV s to check this property. For each chosen IV , we make a multiset attack as above and calculate 255 i=0 z i,0 . We found that the least significant byte of this sum is always 0. This gives a very simple distinguishing attack of complexity 2 8 IV's and key-stream words for 13-round SNOW 3G. We expect that this attack can be extended into a key recovery attack on 14-round SNOW 3G, but we preferred to concentrate on breaking more rounds of SNOW 3G ⊕ instead.
Distinguishing Attack on 14-Round SNOW 3G
⊕
The above distinguisher can be extended by several rounds in SNOW 3G ⊕ . For each secret key K, we also randomly choose an IV and make a multiset at the most significant byte IV 0 0 of the most significant word IV 0 such that it takes all the byte values in [0, 255] exactly once. The multiset difference propagation is formally derived in Table 6 in Appendix A, where Δ i = i denotes the difference in IV 0 0 for i = 0, · · · , 255. From that table, we can see that until round 11, the Table 2 . Multiset sum propagation in 13-round initialization of SNOW 3G. (? indicates that the sum in this byte takes some random value and 0 means that the corresponding sum is 0). difference Δ i will not affect the memory registers R i (i = 1, 2, 3). Hence, at the end of round 10, the contents in R i (i = 1, 2, 3) are three unknown constants not depending on IV 0 and the difference Δ i . Let the unknown constant in R i be c i for i = 1, 2, 3. Table 3 shows the contents evolution process in the three memory registers. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 1. If there are 14 initialization rounds in SNOW 3G
⊕ and the multiset is taken at IV 0 0 , then
Proof. From the line 14 of Table 3 and the keystream equation (2), we have
Note that there is only one active byte in IV 0 , so we have 
R1
R2 R3
where 
It is easy to see that (5), (6) and (7) equal to 0 for any value of its inputs, while the value of (4) is dependent on the input value. Let (3) = a, by passing the vector (a, 0, 0, 0) through the M C 1 we finish the proof.
Theorem 1 shows that the four sub-bytes of 255 i=0 z i,0 are correlated. In experiments, we randomly choose 2 6 IV s to verify it. We found that Theorem 1 holds all the time. This property is a distinguisher with a complexity of 2 8 steps, given 1 keystream word for each IV .
Key Recovery Attack on 14-Round SNOW 3G
⊕
The above distinguisher can be converted into a key recovery attack on 14-round SNOW 3G
⊕ . It works as follows. From Theorem 1, we have
where with β i ∈ GF (2 8 ) for i = 1, 2. For IV and IV , we also make a multiset at the corresponding most significant byte. Our observation is that for such chosen IV s, we can derive similar equations to (8) due to the linearity of
where y(β 1 ) = y(β 2 ) = y(0) according to the conditions 2 and 4. From (8)− (10), we can derive A 1 11 with 2 24 steps. It is interesting to note that we cannot restore A 0 11 and y(0) together with A 1 11 from (8) − (10). The reason is that (8) − (10) cannot be regraded as random equations, which is supported by extensive experiments. Note that the information we recovered is the byte where we introduce the difference β i . In order to determine other bytes of A 11 , we just shift the byte position where the difference β i is introduced to A r 11 (r = 2, 3). Thus, we will get equations looking like
for randomly chosen γ j , δ j ∈ GF (2 8 ) (j = 1, 2, 3), from which we can recover A 2 11 and A 3 11 . We can determine A 0 11 by shifting the multiset position to another byte and introduce the byte differences at A 0 11 . Thus, we will get
for randomly chosen ξ j ∈ GF (2 8 )(j = 1, 2, 3). In this case, 255 i=0 z i,0 =(a, 2a, 3a, a) with a ∈ GF (2 8 ). Next, we can restore s 17 ⊕ C 12 by substituting A i 11 (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) into the solution set of (8)− (10), identifying the corresponding variable and determining m i . To make a full key recovery, we need to look at the second keystream word and derive the following byte equations:
for randomly chosen α j (j = 1, 2, 3). Since A 11 is known, we can recover A in a similar manner. After obtaining A 12 , we can restore s 18 by (11) − (14), which is a linear combination of the internal states after initialization. Then we proceed in the same way as above to look at the next 15 keystream words and derive 16 linear equations on the internal states of LFSR after the key/IV setup. Solving this linear system will yield the initial internal state of the LFSR. The values of the three memory registers can be recovered from A 11 , A 12 and s 17 ⊕ C 12 according to Table 4 . Then we can run the cipher backwards to recover the secret key since all the steps here are invertible.
The total complexity of the above attack is 4 · 2 24 + 4 · 2 8 + 4 · 2 24 + 4 · 2 8 ≈ 2 27 steps and 17 keystream words for each IV . We also made experiments to verify the attack. The experiments show that there are exactly 256 solutions to (7) − (9) with a common A 1 11 and (10) − (13) behaves like random equations. From (10) − (13), we always recover A 12 and s 18 correctly.
Key Recovery Attack on 15-Round SNOW 3G
⊕
In this and the following subsections, we extend previous ideas and combine them with the Gilbert-Minier [3] like ideas of functional collisions in order to cover more rounds of SNOW 3G
⊕ . For 15-round SNOW 3G ⊕ , from the first keystream word we have:
Note that the first term 
(19) Expanding (19) to byte equations, we have
where
are randomly chosen byte differences with t to be determined. Our first observation is that there is no unknown variables on the right hand of (21) − (23), so these equations can be used directly to restore the involving variables. However, if we try to solve (21) ), we need to choose t = 7 and the time complexity is 2 56 steps. In order to get an efficient attack, we proceed as follows.
We regard the left part of (21) ). Note that there are 7 bytes involved here and if these bytes take the same value for two independent IV s, the outputs of (21) should be equal. In order to detect such an internal collision, we randomly choose a series of byte differences η j (1 ≤ j ≤ t) and compare the corresponding output kc 1 j . If a pair of IV , IV and IV , passes all the t tests, i.e., the outputs of (21) remain the same for η j (1 ≤ j ≤ t), we can conclude with high probability that the 7 bytes involved in the two equations have the same value for IV and IV .
More precisely, given 2
will guarantee that there exists such a pair. To filter out the wrong candidates, we choose t = 8. A wrong candidate will pass 8 consecutive tests with probability 2 56 · 2 −64 = 2 −8 which is less than 1, while the correct candidate will always pass the tests. We use the standard birthday paradox argument to detect such a pair, the time complexity is about 2 28 · 8 = 2 31 steps. Now we have two IV s, IV and IV , that generate the same input values for (21), i.e.,
We need to investigate the value evolution process of the memory registers in the first 10 rounds of initialization to derive the state information, which is shown in Table 4 . In Table 4 , c i (i = 1, 2, 3) are the same variables as those in Table 3 .
We have the following facts on Table 4 when the (K, IV i ) pair are chosen according to the conditions (24) and (25): Table 4 . The value evolution process of the memory registers in the first 10-round initialization of SNOW 3G ⊕ (hi (i = 1, 2, 3) are known constants)
and C 4 = C 4 , which are only determined by K.
6. B 10 = B 10 , i.e., c 2 = c 2 .
From Table 4 , A 11 = c 2 ⊕c 3 ⊕k 3 ⊕IV 0 and A 11 = A 11 , we have c 3 ⊕c
We can determine A 8 and A 8 from (26) and A 8 ⊕ A 8 = IV 1 ⊕ IV 1 with 2 32 steps. Knowing A 8 and A 8 , we can derive c 3 and c 3 . So far, we have partially recovered the internal states corresponding to IV and IV .
Key Recovery Attack on 18-Round SNOW 3G
⊕ Now we skip the 16 and 17 rounds case, since they are similar and go directly to the 18-round. Let us denote
then from the first keystream word, we have:
Here by using multisets, we get rid of the LFSR words, 
we know that if we choose IV and IV such that: IV 3 = IV 3 and 
. If we undo the M C 1 on both sides of (27), we can see that in order to have a collision on the involved variables of the left side of (27), we need the following 32-bit conditions:
(34)
There are 96 bits involved here, so 2 48 random (K, IV ) pairs satisfying the above specified conditions will ensure that there exists such a collision with high probability. Then injecting the byte differences λ j (1 ≤ j ≤ 8) into the second most significant byte of the involved variables will preserve the collision. Such a collision can be detected by changing these byte differences and comparing the most and second most significant bytes of the corresponding keystream words xors. The time complexity of this detection is 2 48 · 8 · 2 = 2 52 steps. Then from Table 4 and (34) − (36), we have c 1 = c 1 , i.e.,
From Table 4 , B 8 is determined by B 6 and C 6 which are the same when the key and IV 3 are fixed, and thus B 8 = B 8 . Further, from (37), we get A 8 = A 8 , i.e.,
which is an unknown constant, then from (38) we get V in 2 32 steps. Then we know A 6 = V ⊕ IV 2 and Table 4 . Again from Table 4 , we have
So we can derive k 1 ⊕ B 8 from (39) in 2 32 steps. Combining k 1 ⊕ B 8 with A 6 and A 6 , we get c 2 and c 2 . Then from A 11 = A 11 , we get c 3 ⊕ c 3 = IV 0 ⊕ IV 0 ⊕ c 2 ⊕ c 2 , i.e.,
H(IV
From (40), we can get k 0 ⊕ G(B 6 ) in 2 32 steps. Thus, we know A 8 and A 8 , c 3 and c 3 . So far, the information restored is shown in Table 5 , where ♣ means recovered and ♦ means partially recovered. In order to recover the key, we recall the above attack once with a different value of IV 3 = IV 3 , i.e., we choose another set of 2 48 random (K, IV ) pairs such that the key K is the same as before and the IV s satisfy the same conditions, but with a different set of values. Then the above analysis process also applies to the second set. Our observation is that the values of the registers in the FSM in the second set case are highly correlated to those in the first set case. 
From (41) and (42), we have
From (43) 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown chosen IV resynchronization attacks on SNOW 3G and SNOW 3G ⊕ . We show full key-recovery attacks on up to 18 out of 33 initialization rounds of SNOW 3G ⊕ using a multiset collision idea. We also show 13-round distinguisher of 2 8 complexity for the actual SNOW 3G. Practical parts of all these attacks have been verified experimentally on a PC. Our results show that about half of the initialization rounds of SNOW 3G might succumb to chosen IV resynchronization attacks. The remaining security margin however is quite significant and thus these attacks pose no threat to the security of SNOW 3G.
